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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CHRISTINA R. STOKES, : 
Plaintiff- : Case No. 960280 
Appellant, (960400337) 
vs. Oral Argument 
: Priority 15 
MARY J. PULLEY, WENDELL 
HANSEN, CAMILLE FOWLER, : 
JIM HANSEN and REGAN HANSEN, 
Defendants-
Appellees. : 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (j) (1997), as the appeal was poured over 
from the Supreme Court by order dated October 29, 1996. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Whether a close family relationship between the property 
owners in a boundary by acquiescence case creates a presumption of, 
or carries greater weight as to, nonacquiescence in the artificial 
boundary? 
This issue was implicitly raised at trial (R. 550-551). 
This is a question of law reviewed nondeferentially for 
correctness. Jacobs v. Hafen. 917 P.2d 1078, 1080 (Utah 1996); 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994); Carter v. Hanrath. 
885 P.2d 801, 803 (Utah App. 1994), rev'd on other grounds, 925 
P.2d 960 (Utah 1996). 
2. Whether the district court improperly found that the 
owners of the two properties prior to 1967 mutually acquiesced in 
the artificial boundary? 
This issue was also raised implicitly at trial (R. 550-551) 
and more generally in plaintiff-appellant7s Reply Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 102-101). 
If the previous question is answered in the negative, this 
question is one of fact. "A trial court's findings of fact are 
reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard." Gillmor v. Cummings, 
904 P.2d 703, 706 (Utah App. 1995); Clair W. and Gladys Judd v. 
Hutchinas, 797 P.2d 1088, 1090 (Utah 1990); Carter v. Hanrath, 885 
P.2d 801, 803 (Utah App. 1994), rev'd on other grounds, 925 P.2d 
960 (Utah 1996); Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). 
If the previous question is answered in the affirmative, this 
question is a mixed one of law and fact and is reviewed under an 
abuse of discretion standard. State v. Pena, 869 P. 2d 932, 936-939 
(Utah 1994). A trial court abuses its discretion if there is "no 
reasonable basis for the decision." Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 
860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993). 
3. Whether the district court improperly found that the two 
properties were adjoininqf and improperly concluded that boundary 
by acquiescence had been established, where the two properties are 
not adjoining according to legal description? 
This issue was raised in plaintiff-appellant's Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 76) , Reply Memorandum in 
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Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 101-100), Trial Brief 
(R. 123), Response to Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 
267-266), and at trial (R. 553-555). 
This question is a mixed one of law and fact and is reviewed 
under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 
932, 936-939 (Utah 1994). A trial court abuses its discretion if 
there "no reasonable basis for the decision." Crookston v. Fire 
Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes or rules 
whose interpretation is determinative of or of central importance 
to this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A
« Nature Of The Case, Course of Proceedings. and 
Disposition Below. Plaintiff-appellant filed this action for quiet 
title and trespass to real property on June 21, 1994 (R. 3-1) . 
Defendants-appellees answered the complaint and counter-claimed on 
August 11, 1994 (R. 23-16). Plaintiff-appellant then filed a 
motion for summary judgment on March 14, 1994 (R. 51-50), which the 
district court eventually denied on May 5, 1994 (R. 120). 
Defendants-appellees subsequently filed a motion for summary 
judgment on November 9, 1995 (R. 176-175), which the district court 
eventually denied on January 2, 1996 (R. 276-275). 
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The district court held a bench trial on March 21, 1996 (R. 
323-565), and entered an Order of Judgment (R. 316-312) and 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 311-303) on May 21, 
1996, The district court found that defendant-appellant Mary J. 
Pulley had established boundary by acquiescence and ordered that 
her deed be reformed to include the disputed property. The 
district court also found that defendants-appellants had not 
trespassed on the property of plaintiff-appellant. This appeal 
followed (R. 318-317). 
C. Statement Of Facts. Plaintiff-appellant, Christina R. 
Stokes ("Stokes"), owns a parcel of property in American Fork, 
Utah, more particularly described as: 
Beginning 16.50 chains North of the Southwest 
corner of the Northwest quarter of Section 18, 
Township 5 South, Range 2 East of the Salt 
Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 2.50 
chains East 4.00 chains; thence South 2.50 
chains; thence West 4.00 chains to the place 
of beginning. Area 1.0 acres. 
(R. 310) ("Stokes property"). The Stokes property is identified on 
the county plat map (Trial Exhibit 1) and diagram of property 
(Trial Exhibit 2) included in the appendix to this brief. 
Defendant-appellee, Mary J. Pulley ("Pulley"), owns a parcel of 
property north of the Stokes property ("Pulley property") con-
sisting of approximately 4 acres and also identified on the map and 
diagram included in the appendix to this brief. 
Both properties were once part of a larger parcel of property 
owned by Andrew Pulley (R. 311-310). In 1934, Andrew Pulley deeded 
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the Stokes property to his son, Adolphus Pulley (R. 310) . In 1946 
he deeded the remainder of his property to his daughter, Pulley (R. 
241) . The property deeded to Pulley at that time is more 
particularly described as: 
Beginning at the center of Section 18, 
Township 5 South, Range 2 East, Salt Lake Base 
and Meridian; thence West 27.15 chains; thence 
North 33 1' East 12.58 chains; thence South 85 
56' West 6.18 chains; thence North 4.58 
chains; thence West 3.28 chains; thence North 
2.50 chains; thence West 4.00 chains; thence 
North 7.00 chains; thence East 25.00 chains; 
thence South 6.50 chains; thence East 15.00 
chains; thence South 20.00 chains to place of 
beginning. Area 75.85 acres more or less. 
(R. 310-3 09). Pulley transferred away most of the property deeded 
to her, but continues to own the four acres north of the Stokes 
property (R. 240). According to the legal descriptions, the two 
properties are separated by a strip of land owned by neither party 
("description gap"). 
Adolphus Pulley, and after his death, his wife, Thelma Pulley, 
owned the Stokes property until 1967 (R. 240) . Sometime in the 
1940's, while both properties were owned by members of the Pulley 
family, trees and bushes were planted, and a fence erected, within 
the Stokes property, approximately 43 feet south of its northern 
boundary (R. 308) . The area between the fence/tree line and the 
northern boundary of the Stokes property is the disputed property 
in this case ("disputed property"). 
In 1967, Thelma Pulley deeded the Stokes property to Lewis and 
Carolyn Madsen (R. 240), who, in 1973, deeded the property to 
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Charles and Xenna Boyer (R. 240), who, in 1979, deeded the property 
to Stokes (R. 240). When she purchased her property, or sometime 
thereafter, Stokes learned that her property extended beyond the 
fence/tree line to include the disputed property (R. 308). Both 
Stokes and defendants-appellees now claim ownership of the disputed 
property (R. 17). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The finding of the district court that Pulley and Stokes' 
predecessors had mutually acquiesced in the artificial boundary for 
more than twenty years should be set aside. This is because the 
family relationship between the property owners between 194 6 and 
1967 should have lead to the conclusion that any occupation of the 
disputed property to the fence/tree line by Pulley was permissive 
and not in disregard of the actual boundary line. Furthermore, the 
evidence in support of the finding, consisting of testimony that 
the fence/tree line had always served as the actual boundary, was 
clearly outweighed by evidence that the property owners in fact 
never treated the fence/tree line as a boundary. 
The finding and conclusion of the district court that the two 
properties have been and are adjoining should also be set aside. 
This is because the properties are in fact separated, not 
adjoining. The law requiring that they be adjoining is clear and 
must be applied strictly, and there is no precedent for expanding 
that requirement. Thus it was an abuse of discretion for the court 
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to conclude, based on the facts in this case, that the requirement 
had been satisfied. 
Therefore, the judgment of the district court should be 
reversed since the above requirements for boundary by acquiescence 
have not been met. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
A CLOSE FAMILY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ADJOINING PROPERTY 
OWNERS SHOULD CREATE A PRESUMPTION OFf OR CARRY GREATER WEIGHT 
AS TO, NONACQUIESCENCE IN THE ARTIFICIAL BOUNDARY 
To establish boundary by acquiescence, "the party claiming 
title by acquiescence must establish all of the required elements 
to give rise to a presumption of ownership in his or her favor." 
Enalert v. Zane. 848 P.2d 165, 168-169 (Utah App. 1993). The 
elements are (i) occupation up to a visible line marked by monu-
ments, fences, or buildings, (ii) mutual acquiescence in the line 
as a boundary, (iii) for a period of at least 20 years, (iv) by 
adjoining landowners. Jacobs v. Hafen, 917 P.2d 1078, 1081 (Utah 
1996). This doctrine has always been strictly applied in Utah. 
Enalert, 848 P.2d at 168; Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417, 423 
(Utah 1990). 
Therefore, in order to establish boundary by acquiescence, the 
owners of the properties must have mutually acquiesced in the 
artificial boundary line for a period of twenty years. Jacobs, 917 
P.2d at 1081 (Utah 1996). That is, during the requisite period of 
time, the property owners must have treated the artificial boundary 
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as the actual boundary. Where "neither party treated the fence as 
the actual boundary, there could be no knowledge of or acquiescence 
to the line as a boundary line." Carter v. Hanrath, 885 P.2d 801, 
805 (Utah App. 1994), rev'd on other grounds. 925 P.2d 260 (Utah 
1996). Nothing prevents a party from "claim[ing] to the true 
boundary, . . . where it is clear that the line as located was not 
intended as a boundary. " Brown v. Milliner, 232 P. 2d 202, 2 07 
(Utah 1951). 
When the owners on either side of disputed property are not 
related, their activities such as caring for, or repairing the 
property up to, the artificial boundary line, may naturally lead to 
the conclusion that both acknowledge it as the actual boundary. 
However, when the property owners are closely related, such as 
parent and child, or brother and sister, such activities are likely 
to be for the benefit of the other and should not imply acquies-
cence in the artificial boundary. 
The mutual acquiescence requirement for establishing boundary 
by acquiescence is similar to the adverse use requirement for 
establishing common law adverse possession or prescriptive 
easement. Homer v. Smith, 866 P. 2d 622, 626 (Utah App. 1993) 
(identifying elements of prescriptive easement). All three 
doctrines are based on the notion that a property owner must 
resolve disputes regarding ownership within a reasonable time or 
relinquish her right to the disputed property. The doctrines also 
recognize that there can be no relinquishment until there has been 
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some dispute needing to be resolved or misunderstanding needing to 
be corrected. Thus, there can be no adverse possession or 
prescriptive easement when the occupation by the other party has 
been permissive. Similarly, there can be no boundary by ac-
quiescence when the occupation by the other party up to the 
artificial boundary is permissive and it is not recognized or 
treated as the actual boundary. 
It is generally recognized in adverse possession and prescr-
iptive easement cases that a family relationship between the 
parties creates a presumption of permissive use, or rebuts a 
presumption of adverse use, shifting the burden to the other party 
to prove clear, definite, and unequivocal notice of adverse use. 
2 Am. Jur. 2d Adverse Possession § 202-203 (1986); see also Smith 
v. Smith, 511 P. 2d 294, 300 (Id. 1973) (occupation was not hostile 
since parties were brothers and sister); Watson v. Chilton, 187 
S.E.2d 482, 484 (N.C. App. 1972); Tallent v. Barrett. 598 S.W.2d 
602, 606 (Mo. App. 1980) (stronger evidence of adverse possession 
required in the presence of a family relationship); Fehl v. Horst, 
474 P. 2d 525, 527 (Or. 1970) (close family relationship requires 
greater showing that possession was hostile or adverse); Metze v. 
Meetze, 97 S.E.2d 514, 515 (S.C. 1957) (family relationship between 
father and son-in-law rebuts presumption that encroaching hedges 
was hostile to father); Mcintosh v. Chincoteaaue Volunteer Fire 
Co., 260 S.E.2d 457, 460 (Va. 1979) (adverse possession of child 
against parent requires clear, definite, or unequivocal notice; 
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erecting fence, using privy, and picking blackberries is not 
enough). 
This principle appears to be recognized in Utah also. In 
Godfrey v. Munson, 597 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1979), the Utah Supreme 
Court implied that a family relationship would prevent or rebut a 
presumption of adverse possession where the parties are members of 
an immediate family. See also Rippentrop v. Pickering, 387 P.2d 
94, 95 (Utah 1963) (prescriptive easement claim dismissed where 
driveway had been used by adjoining property owners who for many 
years were members of same family). In other cases, Utah courts 
have rejected such a presumption, but have recognized the 
importance of a family relationship in determining permissive use. 
See, e.g. Homer v. Smith, 866 P.2d 622, 627 (Utah App. 1993). 
This principle has not yet been applied to boundary by 
acquiescence cases in Utah. However, Utah courts have recognized 
that boundary by acquiescence cannot be established in situations 
where "there was no room for any implication that the fence line 
had been erected by adjoining owners pursuant to an agreement 
between them as to the location of the boundary between them." 
Brown, 232 P.2d at 207-208 (Utah 1951). For example, mutual 
acquiescence cannot be found to have occurred during a time "when 
land on both sides of the fence was owned by the same person." 
Brown, 232 P.2d at 207 (citing Home Owners' Loan Corporation v. 
Dudley, 141 P.2d 160 (Utah 1943). Also, boundary by acquiescence 
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"cannot be established when one of the adjoining tracts of land is 
part of the public domain." Carter, 925 P.2d at 962 (Utah 1996). 
A similar presumption should apply in this case, and Stokes 
requests this Court to recognize that when the property on either 
side of an artificial boundary is occupied by members of the same 
immediate family, such as brother and sister, there is a 
presumption against mutual acquiescence, which must be rebutted 
with clear evidence to the contrary. In the alternative, the Court 
should at least recognize that the family relationship is a factor 
demanding greater weight in a determination regarding mutual 
acquiescence. 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY POUND THAT PULLEY 
AND THE PREDECESSOR OF STOKES MUTUALLY ACQUIESCED IN THE 
ARTIFICIAL BOUNDARY PRIOR TO 1967 
In its Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law, the district 
court found that for at least 33 years, from 1946 to 1979, Pulley 
and the owners of the Stokes property prior to Stokes "considered 
and acquiesced to the fence/tree line as the boundary" between the 
two properties (R. 3 09). The evidence regarding the period from 
1967 to 1979 was mainly uncontroverted. However, with respect to 
the period from 1946 to 1967, this finding is clearly erroneous. 
The finding is supported by the testimony of John Pulley, Ron 
Pulley, Julie James, and Wendell Hansen, all relatives of Pulley 
who lived on the Pulley or Stokes property between 1946 to 1967. 
They testified that the fence/tree line had always served as the 
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boundary between the Pulley and Stokes property (R. 469, 475, 488, 
and 499) , that Pulley regularly mowed, watered, and planted flowers 
on the disputed property (R. 470, 489), and that Andrew Pulley had 
farmed the disputed property (R. 498). 
However, the same witnesses provided substantially more 
evidence that the fence/tree line was not treated as a boundary 
between 1946 and 1967. Instead, the property owners gave each 
other liberal access to each other's property, almost as though 
there were no division between them. 
John Pulley testified that Pulley would also mow and water the 
property south of the fence/tree line for her brother (R. 471-472) . 
Ron Pulley testified that, while living on the Stokes property, he 
sometimes mowed the lawn on both sides of the fence/tree line (R. 
476), that the row of bushes had to be kept clean so "both of us 
could mow on both sides (R. 479)." His testimony also suggests 
that the fence may have been built originally just to keep in 
animals as opposed to establishing a boundary (R. 479). 
Julie James testified that 
[w]hen I was younger we had—we used to play 
[on the disputed property] all the time. I 
mean we had rock gardens and frog ponds, I 
mean that was—all the cousins, that's what we 
did, we had frog ponds and we go hunt frogs. 
(R. 489). She and other members of her family viewed the Pulley 
home "just like our home. I mean Aunt Mary is our family (R. 
490)." According to Julie, the fence had to be repaired oc-
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casionally because "us kids would climb over and kind of mash it 
down a little bit (R. 495)." 
Finally, Wendell Hansen testified that when he lived on the 
Stokes property he went back and forth between the properties "very 
much" (R. 499) to visit his mother in the Pulley home, and 
remembered "even jumping the fence in the back and going up to see 
my mother (R. 499)." 
The testimonies of these witnesses clearly established that 
the fence/tree line was never treated as the actual boundary 
between the properties. In addition, Stokes testified that she had 
a conversation with Pulley in May, 1979, in which Stokes stated 
that she had learned that she owned some property north of the 
fence/tree line. According to Stokes, Pulley admitted that 
although she had been taking care of the property, it belonged to 
Stokes (R. 370), and Pulley requested permission to continue using 
it for a Christmas pageant (R. 336), suggesting that Pulley never 
believed the fence/tree line to be the actual boundary. This was 
uncontroverted and the district court did not specifically find 
that her credibility was questionable. 
Therefore, without the application of any presumption, the 
finding of the district court that mutual acquiescence occurred 
between 1946 and 1967 is clearly erroneous. However, as explained 
above, the family relationship between the property owners at that 
time should create a presumption of nonacquiescence, rebut any 
presumption of mutual acquiescence, or should at least be given 
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greater weight than the fact that Pulley occupied and maintained 
the disputed property. If such a presumption applies, the finding 
of the district court is unreasonable and an abuse of discretion. 
Mutual acquiescence may have occurred at the earliest from 1967 to 
1979. This is less than twenty years and is insufficient to 
establish boundary by acquiescence. Therefore, the judgment of the 
district court must be reversed. 
POINT III 
THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY FOUND THAT 
THE PROPERTIES WERE ADJOINING 
Another requirement for boundary by acquiescence is that the 
properties must be adjoining. Jacobs v. Hafen, 917 P. 2d 1078, 1081 
(Utah 1996). This requirement, like the others, must be strictly 
applied. Staker v. Ainsworth. 785 P.2d 417, 423 (Utah 1990). In 
this case, the district court has abused its discretion and 
misapplied the law to the facts. 
Black's Law Dictionary defines "adjoining" to mean "touching 
or contiguous, as distinguished from lying near to or adjacent. To 
be in contact with; to abut upon." Black's Law Dictionary 712 (6th 
ed. 1990). It also defines "adjoining owners" as "persons who own 
land touching the subject land." Id. 
According to the legal descriptions, the Stokes and Pulley 
properties are completely separated by a strip of land owned by 
neither party. In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the 
district court found and concluded that the Pulley and Stokes 
property have been and are adjoining lots (R. 307 and 305). This 
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was based on its other findings that the description gap was 
unintended by Andrew Pulley, who deeded the property to Pulley, and 
resulted from a mistake in the description process (R. 3 07). 
Although Stokes provided another explanation for the description 
gap as evidence that it was intentional, the finding of the court 
that it was unintentional was adequately supported and is not 
challenged here. 
Even if unintentional, the fact remains, however, that the 
properties are not adjoining according to legal description. The 
requirement that they be adjoining is clear and should be strictly 
applied. There are no cases recognizing any exception to the 
requirement, let alone an exception for a mistake in description. 
In its memorandum decision, the court cited Affleck v. Morgan. 364 
P.2d 663 (Utah 1961) in support of its finding, but that case is 
not on point and does not recognize any such exception. The 
district court had no discretion to create such an exception and 
abused its discretion in finding and concluding that the 
requirement had been satisfied in this circumstance. Therefore, 
for that reason, the judgment of the district court should be 
reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons above, Stokes respectfully requests that this 
Court reverse the decision of the district court and require the 
district court to quiet title in her. 
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STATEMENT REGARDING DOCKETING STATEMENT 
Stokes acknowledges that she has raised in this brief issues 
beyond that identified in her docketing statement of August 19, 
1996. However, the Utah Supreme Court has recently held that 
failure to list all issues presented for review in the original 
docketing statement does not preclude the appellant from raising 
them in the brief. Nelson by and through Stuckman v. Salt Lake 
City, 919 P.2d 568, 572 (Utah 1996). This is because the 
"docketing statement is for the benefit of the Court, not the 
appellee." Id. 
In that case, the appellant had filed an amended docketing 
statement raising the additional issues. Stokes has not done this 
because there is currently no rule identifying the format or 
procedure for filing an amended docketing statement. However, if 
that is a prerequisite to raising additional issues in her brief, 
Stokes will follow whatever instructions this Court may give her. 
DATED this ^ day of October, 1997. 
HELEN H. ANDERSON, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
was mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this day of 
October, 1997. 
T. McKay Stirland, Esq. 
Donald E. McCandless, Esq. 
Fisher, Scribner, Moody & Stirland 
2696 N. University Ave., Suite 220 
Provo, UT 84604 
-S-ECRETARY 
J:\HHA\STOKES.BRF 
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APPENDIX A 
County Plat Map (Trial Exhibit 1) 
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APPENDIX B 
Diagram of Property (Trial Exhibit 2) 
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